Abstract: This paper examines the connection between the legal environment and financial development, and then traces this link through to long-run economic growth. Countries with legal and regulatory systems that (1) give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations, (2) enforce contracts effectively, and (3) promote comprehensive and accurate financial reporting by corporations have better-developed financial intermediaries. The data also indicate that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development -the component of financial intermediary development defined by the legal and regulatory environment -is positively associated with economic growth. * Department of Economics, 114 Rouss Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903-3288; RL9J@virginia.edu. I thank Thorsten Beck, Maria Carkovic, Bill Easterly, Lant Pritchett, Andrei Shleifer, and seminar participants at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the University of Virginia, and the World Bank for helpful comments.
1 Does financial development affect long-run economic growth? Economists hold remarkably different views regarding the answer to this question. At one end of the spectrum, many argue that better financial systems --financial systems that are better at identifying the most worthwhile projects, exerting corporate control, mobilizing savings, providing risk management facilities, and easing transactions --accelerate economic growth [Bagehot 1873 , Schumpeter 1911 , and Hicks 1969 . Others question the direction of causality. Robinson (1952) asserts that economic growth creates demands for financial services and the financial system responds to provide these services.
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Although King and Levine (1993b) show that measures of financial intermediary development are good predictors of economic growth, these results neither settle the issue of causality nor identify the determinants of financial development.
2 As argued by Rajan and Zingales (1996) , financial markets may anticipate economic growth and respond by developing in anticipation of greater economic activity. Thus, financial development may simply be a leading indicator, rather than an underlying cause. Also, financial development and economic growth may be driven by a common omitted variable. Thus, the observed positive association may not imply a causal link.
Given the debate about whether finance causes growth and the lack of information regarding the sources of financial development, this paper addresses two questions. First, what are the legal and regulatory determinants of financial intermediary development? Second, is the exogenous component of financial intermediary development -the component of financial intermediary development defined by the legal and regulatory environment -positively associated with economic growth? Answering the first question -that is, providing information on the roots of financial development --is valuable regardless of potential links with steady-state growth. For example, the functioning of financial intermediaries may affect business-cycles and the level of income per capita. Policy makers, therefore, may desire information on the legal and regulatory determinants of financial systems irrespective of the potential ties with steady-state growth. 3 Toward this end, this paper constitutes the first broad cross-country documentation of the relationship between financial intermediary development and national legal and regulatory characteristics. The paper complements LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1997) study of the legal determinants of equity and bond markets.
In terms of the second question, this paper uses the legal and regulatory determinants of financial development as instrumental variables and examines whether an increase in the exogenous component of financial development causes more rapid growth. Thus, this paper will help resolve the issue of whether financial development is simply a leading indicator of economic growth, or whether the financial system exerts a causal influence on economic performance. This is the first study of whether the component of financial development defined by the legal and regulatory environment is positively associated with growth.
Part I of this paper searches across a new cross-country data set to identify the determinants of financial intermediary development. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny (1996, henceforth LLSV 1996) assemble data on the legal and regulatory treatment of remain subject to the problems that financial development may be a leading indicator but not a cause of growth, and they do not identify the determinants of financial development.
creditors, the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts, and accounting standards.
Since contractual arrangements form the basis of financial activities, legal systems that protect creditors and enforce contracts are likely to encourage greater financial intermediary development than legal and regulatory systems that impede creditors from gaining access to their claims or that ineffectively enforce contracts. Similarly, since information about corporations is critical for exercising corporate control and identifying creditworthy firms, accounting standards that simplify the interpretability and comparability of corporate financial statements will tend to ease financial activities. Moreover, LLSV (1996) show that differences in the legal treatment of creditors, legal system efficiency, and the comprehensiveness and quality of information disclosed in corporate annual reports are systematically linked to the country's legal origin.
Specifically, LLSV (1996) divide the sample into countries with predominantly English, French, German, or Scandinavian legal origins. Since most countries obtained their legal systems through occupation and colonization and since these systems vary little over time, the legal variables are treated as exogenous for the post-1960 period. 4 Part I finds that the legal and regulatory environment influences financial intermediary development. To measure financial development, this paper uses the King and Levine (1993b, This paper complements recent alternative methods for addressing the issue of causality.
Using industry-level data, Rajan and Zingales (1996) show that industries that rely comparatively heavily on external funding grow comparatively faster (than industries that do not rely heavily on external capital) in countries with well-developed financial systems. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) show that firms with access to better developed financial systems grow faster than they could have grown without this access. Furthermore, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that when individual states of the United States relaxed intrastate banking restrictions, bank lending quality improved and economic growth accelerated.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I establishes an empirical connection between cross-country differences in banking development and cross-country differences in the legal and regulatory environment. Part II then traces the impact of differences in the legal and regulatory environment on banking development through to economic growth. The data indicate that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development --the component defined by the legal and regulatory system --is positively associated with economic growth. The third and fourth measures partially address concerns about the allocation of credit.
5 KL(1993a,b) provide data sources and summary statistics of the financial intermediary indicators.
The third measure, PRIVATE, equals the ratio of credit allocated to the private sector to total domestic credit (excluding credit to banks). The fourth measure, PRIVY, equals credit to the private sector divided by GDP. Directed credit initiatives and government subsidy programs may importantly influence the fraction of credit allocated to the private sector. The assumption underlying these measures is that financial systems that allocate more credit to the private sector are more engaged in researching firms, exerting corporate control, providing risk management services, mobilizing savings, and facilitating transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit to the government or state owned enterprises.
B. Creditor rights and financial intermediary development
As discussed in LLSV (1996) Similarly, countries where managers stay in control of the firm pending the resolution of the reorganization process (MANAGES=1) tend to have less well-developed financial intermediaries than countries where officials appointed by creditor or the courts assume responsibility for the operation of the business during reorganization. As shown in Table 2, MANAGES enters all of the regressions negatively, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the LLY equation and at the 0.10 level in the PRIVATE and PRIVY regressions.
The findings are strongest for SECURED1. Countries where non-secured creditors, such as the government or labor, are given priority in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm (SECURED1=0) tend to have less welldeveloped financial intermediary sectors than countries where secured creditors are ranked first (SECURED1=1). As shown in Table 3 , SECURED1 enters the LLY, BANK, and PRIVY equations positively, and significantly at the 0.05 level and enters the PRIVATE equation positively, with a P-value of 0.05.
Finally, these three creditor rights indicators are combined into an aggregate index designed to be positively associated with creditor rights. Specifically,
CREDITOR = SECURED1 -AUTOSTAY -MANAGES, and takes on values between 1 (best)
and -2 (worst). As shown in Table 4 , CREDITOR is significantly positively correlated with LLY, BANK, and PRIVY at the 0.05 level and with PRIVATE at the 0.07 level. Countries with legal systems that assign a high priority to secured creditors receiving their pledged claims tend to have more well-developed intermediaries.
C. Enforcement of contracts and financial intermediary development
The laws and regulations governing secured creditors will affect secured creditors only to the extent that the laws and regulations are enforced. Indeed, comparatively lax creditor rights laws in conjunction with efficient property rights enforcement may promote financial intermediary activities more effectively than strong creditor rights laws with lax enforcement.
Consequently, two measures of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts are included from LLSV (1996) .
RULELAW is an assessment of the law and order tradition of the country that ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. This measure was constructed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and is an average over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . Given the contractual nature of finance, I expect a positive relationship between RULELAW and financial intermediary development.
CONRISK is an assessment of the risk that a government will -and can -modify a contract after it has been signed. CONRISK ranges from 10, low risk of contract modification, Information about corporations is critical for exerting corporate governance and identifying the best investments. These activities will be facilitated by accounting standards that simplify the interpretability and comparability of information across corporations. Furthermore, many types of financial contracting use accounting measures to trigger particular actions. These types of contracts can only be enforced and will only be used if accounting measures are reasonably unambiguous. Accounting standards differ across countries and governments impose an assortment of regulations regarding information disclosure and accounting standards. Since accurate information about corporations may improve financial contracting and intermediation, the paper examines a measure of the quality of information disclosed through corporate accounts from LLSV (1996) .
ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness of company reports. The maximum possible value is 90 and the minimum is 0. The Center for International Financial Analysis and
Research assessed general accounting information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, and stock data in company reports in 1990. Given the importance of information in financial contracting, I expect ACCOUNT to be positively 7 I also examined an interaction term, CREDITOR*CONRISK, to examine whether creditor rights are less important in the presence of an effective contract enforcement system and whether contract enforcement exerts a different impact on financial development depending on the legal treatment of creditors. This interaction term always enters insignificantly.
correlated with financial intermediary development. 8 In particular, one might expect that commercial banks will benefit more from reliable and comparable corporate financial statements than central banks in terms of allocating credit, and accurate information on corporations is likely to be more important for the funding of private firms than for public firms. (1) G = α + βF(i) + γX + ε.
There is a strong positive relationship between each of the four financial development indicators, only difference is that BANK becomes insignificant at the 5 percent level when a large conditioning information set is included 10 In a two-stage least squares framework, the first stage includes more explanatory variables than those in Tables 1-7 . In particular, the limited conditioning information set regressions also include the logarithm of income per capita and the logarithm of secondary. The R-squares in these regressions are typically around 0.40 and the F-statistic always rejects the null hypothesis at the 0.01 significance level that none of the cross-sectional variation in financial intermediary development is explained by the explanatory variables.
C. GMM results over the 1960-1989 period
Consider first a straight application of instrumental variables over the 1960-89 period. Table 9 summarizes two sets of results. The "limited conditioning information set" results use a small X matrix that includes only the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP and the logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment. The "full conditioning information set" regressions use a large X matrix that also includes government consumption expenditures divided by GDP averaged over the period, exports plus imports divided by GDP averaged over the period, and the average annual inflation rate. 11 I treat the X matrix as exogenous because I am focusing on examining the question of whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development as defined by the legal and regulatory environment is positively associated with economic growth.
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The results indicate a strong link between the exogenous component of financial development and economic growth. The coefficient on financial intermediary development is significant at the 5 percent level in seven out of the eight regressions summarized in Table 9 . 13 Further, the data do not reject the null orthogonality conditions; the data do not reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the equation (1) error term at the 10 percent level. Put differently, the are consistent with the view that the legal and regulatory factors affect growth only through their affect on financial intermediary development.
D. GMM results over the 1980s
Since the legal and regulatory variables are measured over the 1980s, I repeat the analysis using data over the period 1980-89. As shown in Table 10 Tables. 14 Consider, for example, an improvement in creditor rights. The estimated coefficient from Table 4 suggests that a legal or regulatory improvement that boosts the overall creditor rights index, CREDITOR, by a value of one (which is two standard deviations) will increase financial depth, LLY, by a value of 0.11. From Table 10 , we see that this would in turn accelerate economic growth by about one percentage point per year. This is reasonably large considering that the standard deviation of cross-country growth rates is 1.8 percent. Also, consider an improvement in contract enforcement. From Table 6 Table 11 , the part of LLY in 1960 associated with the degree of creditor rights and contract enforcement is strongly, positively associated with economic growth over the next 30 years.
III. Sensitivity Analyses and Discussion
However, the "real" first stage regressions include all of the X variables. This is also immaterial, because the size of the relevant coefficient in the conceptual experiments is not altered much by the inclusion of the other instruments. 15 There are too few observations on BANK, PRIVATE, and PRIVY to replicate this exercise for these financial development indicators. Furthermore, KL (1993b) also use pooled cross-section, time-series procedures, with the data pooled over the three decades. They then use measures of all four financial development indicators at the beginning of each decade and find that financial development predicts decade growth rates. When using this paper's instrumental variables in the KL (1993b) pooled cross-sectional analyses, one still finds that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development -the component defined by the legal and regulatory environment is positively and significantly correlated with long-run economic growth.
A. Sensitivity results
One risk with pure cross-country analyses concerns country-fixed effects. 16 That is, the regression may omit an important explanatory variable that is really driving the results and that is highly correlated with the financial intermediary development indicators. Thus, besides the X variables discussed above, I experimented with a wide-array of additional explanatory variables that other researchers have identified as importantly related to long-run growth.
Specifically, I included the following eight variables to test the robustness of the results to changes in the conditioning information set. First, the black market exchange rate premium is a general index of price, trade, and exchange rate distortions [Dollar 1992 ]. Second, the number of assassinations per capita is one general index of political instability [Banks 1994 ]. Third, the number of revolutions and coups is another commonly used indicator of political instability, and is frequently found to be negatively associated with economic growth [Banks 1994 ].
Fourth, Barro and Lee (1995) construct a general index of political rights. Fifth, the degree of civil liberties is one frequently used measure of political freedom [Gastil 1990 ]. Sixth, the degree to which the regulatory environment obstructs commerce is a general indicator of bureaucratic efficiency [Mauro 1995] . Seventh, the degree of ethnic diversity, which equals the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic group, tends to induce poor policies that slow growth [Easterly and Levine 1997] . Finally, I consider a measure of corruption, which many argue influences economic development [Mauro 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1993] . Each of these variables is used to examine the robustness of this paper's results by controlling for bad government, bad institutions, bad policies, and political instability. 17 Including these additional explanatory variables does not alter this paper's finding that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development -that part of financial development defined by each country's legal and regulatory environment --is strongly, positively correlated with economic growth.
A second potential area of concern is the exogeneity of the instruments. As noted earlier, national legal systems derive largely from four legal origins -English, French, German, and Scandinavian, and these legal systems were disseminated via occupation and colonization [LLSV, 1996] . Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the creditor rights variables are not general indexes of the efficiency of the legal system. They measure the legal rights of secured creditors. As shown above, these creditor rights variables strongly influence financial intermediary development. But, other legal variables, such as laws governing minority shareholder rights, do not strongly influence financial intermediary development. Thus, the instrumental variables measure particular characteristics of the legal system that influence financial intermediary development.
Nevertheless, the "exogeneity" of the general indexes of contract enforcement, such as the rule of law variable, RULELAW, and the contract risk variable, CONRISK may be subject to greater doubt since they are subjective evaluations of the security of contracts. While LLSV (1996) show that these indexes of contract enforcement are closely associated with legal origin, frequencies in examining whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development positively influences long-run growth.
I evaluated the sensitivity of the results to alterations in the instrument set. Specifically, the regressions were re-run (a) omitting CONRISK as an instrumental variable and instead using the LLSV (1996) dummy variables for legal origin, i.e., English, French, German, Scandinavian, and (b) substituting the underlying legal code variables for CREDITOR, namely SECURED1, AUTOSTAY, and MANAGES. These alternative instruments lead to the same conclusions as exemplified in Table 12 : the legal environment importantly affects financial intermediary development, and the exogenous component of the financial system -the component of the financial system defined by the legal environment -is positively and significantly associated with economic growth.
Finally, to further gauge the robustness of the results, I used a conglomerate index of banking development that incorporates information on the size of intermediaries, who is conducting the intermediation, and the allocation of credit. Specifically, this measure equals credit allocated by commercial and deposit-taking banks to the private sector divided by GDP [Levine and Zervos 1997] . These data are only available since 1976. This conglomerate banking index incorporates information from BANK, PRIVATE, and PRIVY and is called BANK-TO-PRIVATE. This banking indicator yields similar conclusions to those reported above: the legal and regulatory environment affects banking development, and the component of the banking system defined by the legal and regulatory environment is positively and robustly correlated with long-run economic growth. Table 13 shows that the exogenous component of BANK-TO-PRIVATE remains significantly correlated with growth when altering the conditioning information set. Moreover, the strong link between long-run economic growth and the exogenous component of BANK-TO-PRIVATE is not sensitive to 17 See Knack and Keefer (1995) for a comprehensive and careful examination of the relationship between economic alternations in the instrumental variables.
B. Perspectives and interpretation
In many respects, this paper's results can be viewed as a merger of KL (1993b ) with LLSV (1996 . I combine the KL (1993b) data on financial intermediary development with the LLSV (1996) data on legal and regulatory indicators. The paper then (1) examines the legal and regulatory determinants of financial intermediary development and (2) tests whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development as defined by the legal and regulatory environment is positively associated with economic growth. The paper can also be viewed as an extension of LLSV (1997) along two dimensions. First, LLSV (1997) examine the legal determinants of equity and bond markets. This paper examines the legal determinants of financial intermediaries. Second, this paper then traces the affect of differences in the legal environment on the financial system through to differences in long-run economic growth rates.
The paper's results are consistent with the arguments made by Bagehot, (1873), Schumpeter (1911), and Hicks (1969) : exogenous improvements in financial intermediary development cause an acceleration in long-run growth rates. The paper's results are also consistent with arguments made by Patrick (1966) , Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , and Greenwood and Smith (1997) : the direction of causality runs in both directions. Namely, the paper does not show that growth does not cause finance. Rather, this paper shows that the component of financial intermediary development associated with the legal and regulatory environment is strongly linked with long-run growth rates.
growth and array of institutional and political indicators.
III. Conclusions
This paper focuses on identifying a connection between the legal and regulatory environment and financial development, and then tracing this link through to long-run economic growth. First, the paper shows that the legal and regulatory environment matters for financial development. Specifically, this paper's findings are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) argument that cross-country differences in legal systems affect the relationship between entrepreneurs and creditors. Countries with legal and regulatory systems that give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations have better functioning financial intermediaries than countries where the legal system provides much weaker support to creditors. Moreover, contract enforcement matters as much as the formal legal and regulatory codes. Countries that impose compliance with laws efficiently and enforce contracts -including government contracts -effectively tend to have much better developed financial intermediaries than countries where enforcement is more lax. Finally, the paper shows that information disclosure matters for financial development. Countries where corporations publish relatively comprehensive and accurate financial statements have betterdeveloped financial intermediaries than countries where published information on corporations is less reliable.
Second, the paper uses the legal and regulatory indicators of creditor rights, contract enforcement, and information disclosure as instrumental variables for financial development.
The data indicate that the exogenous component of financial intermediary development -the component defined by the legal and regulatory environment -is positively associated with economic growth. The results indicate that legal and regulatory changes that boost financial intermediary development will induce a rapid acceleration in long-run economic growth. RULELAW = assessment of the law and order tradition of the country. Scale from 0 to 10; 10 equals most tradition of law and order.
(Heteroskedasticity consistent P-values in parentheses) CONRISK= assessment of the risk that the government will modify a contract. Scale from 1 -10; 10 equals least amount of risk (Heteroskedasticity consistent P-values in parentheses) Instruments: all right-hand variables excluding LLY60, plus SECURED1, MANAGES, AUTOSTAY, and dummy variables for English, French, and German legal origin GOV-Government consumption expenditures divided by GDP; PI=Rate of inflation; TRD=Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP; LLY=Financial Depth. full conditioning information set: other regressors include the limited conditioning information set, plus government dividided by GDP, exports plus imports divided by GDP, and inflation.
Bank-to-Private = Deposit money bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP
